Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain beyond Reach for the Indigent by Harris, David A.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 68 | Number 4 Article 4
4-1-1990
Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses
Remain beyond Reach for the Indigent
David A. Harris
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric Witnesses Remain beyond Reach for the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 763 (1990).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss4/4
AKE REVISITED: EXPERT PSYCHIATRIC
WITNESSES REMAIN BEYOND REACH
FOR THE INDIGENT
DAVID A. HARRISt
The United States Supreme Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma that the
Constitution requires a trial court to appoint a psychiatric expert to assist
an indigent criminal defendant when sanity will be a "'significant fac-
tor" in determining the defendant's guilt. The Court did not specify the
standards or procedures necessary to meet that constitutional require-
ment. Lower federal and state court decisions since Ake have applied its
rule narrowly, restricting government-financed assistance to providing a
single psychiatrist for those defendants who prove pretrial that the aid of
a psychiatrist would alter the outcome of the trial. In this Article, David
A. Harris argues that restrictions on the Ake rule violate constitutional
due process and put indigent defendants at a legal disadvantage relative
to their wealthier counterparts. Mr. Harris concludes that an indigent
defendant who presents evidence of a reasonable need for psychiatric
assistance is entitled to a private psychiatrist of his own choice, to be paid
for, but not controlled, by the state.
In Ake v. Oklahoma1 the United States Supreme Court declared that when
an indigent criminal defendant demonstrates that sanity will be a "significant
factor" at trial, the Constitution requires that the government provide the de-
fendant with a psychiatrist to assist in the evaluation, preparation, and presenta-
tion of the defense.2 The Court did not dictate the manner in which lower
courts should put its decision into effect; rather, it explicitly left implementation
to the states.3 Thus, any system meeting the constitutional minimum is
satisfactory.
Ake is a potentially far-reaching decision. The testimony of psychiatrists
and other experts has become increasingly important in criminal litigation.
4
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1. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
2. Id. at 83.
3. Id. It is implicit in the Court's statement that federal courts at both the trial and appellate
levels also will be implementing the decision.
4. Id. at 82 n.8 (quoting Reilly v. Berry, 250 N.Y. 456, 461, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929) (Car-
dozo, C.J.) ("[U]pon the trial of certain issues, such as insanity or forgery, experts are often neces-
sary both for the prosecution and for defense.... [A] defendant may be at an unfair disadvantage, if
he is unable because of poverty to parry by his own witnesses the thrusts of those against him.")); A.
MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES iii (3d ed. 1986)
[hereinafter SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE] (scientific evidence and expert testimony increasingly vital in
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Ake promises that the indigent will receive some measure of equal justice by
obtaining necessary expert psychiatric assistance.5
The decision to leave implementation to the states raises several questions.
What is the appropriate standard by which to measure requests for the assist-
ance of psychiatric experts? Are indigent defendants receiving the assistance to
which they are constitutionally entitled? If not, what will assure that, hence-
forth, they do? This Article argues that courts have interpreted Ake too nar-
rowly, allowing fewer indigents relief than the Supreme Court intended. This
narrow interpretation has underctit the right announced in Ake and limited the
effective reach of the decision. Only an interpretation of Ake that employs a
standard based on reasonableness and allows the defendant some measure of
participation in the choice of the expert will satisfy Ake's mandate.
I. AKE v OKLAHOMA
In Ake, defendant was charged with murdering a couple and shooting the
couple's two children.6 Noting defendant's bizarre behavior, the court sua
sponte ordered him held for observation. 7 The State's examining psychiatrist
found defendant delusional and probably a paranoid schizophrenic;8 the court
then found defendant incompetent to stand trial and committed him to a state
hospital. 9 Only six weeks later, however, the state hospital's chief forensic psy-
chiatrist informed the court that defendant, now heavily medicated, had become
competent to stand trial. 1 Accordingly, the court declared Ake competent."
Defense counsel then informed the court that he intended to raise the insanity
defense. Because Ake had not been examined to determine his sanity at the time
of the crime, counsel requested that, on account of his indigency, the court pro-
vide defendant with a psychiatrist or with funds to hire his own psychiatrist. 12
criminal investigations and trials as a consequence of increasing specialization of knowledge and
problem solving). As the Supreme Court recognized in Ake, when the defendant's mental state is at
issue, expert testimony is a virtual necessity. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-82.
5. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 76 ("[J]ustice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty,
a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which
his liberty is at stake."). Note, however, that the Court grounded Ake not on the equal protection
clause, but on the due process clause. See id. (grounding the right "in significant part on the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness"); see also infra notes 20-34 and
accompanying text (describing Ake Court's use of due process clause as doctrinal anchor).
6. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70.
7. The trial court ordered that Ake be examined to determine whether an "extended period of
mental observation" was necessary. Id. at 71.
8. Id.
9. Id. The state hospital's chief forensic psychiatrist testified at Ake's competency hearing
that he was a psychotic with a diagnosis of chronic paranoid schizophrenia and that the severity of
his illness and his lack of control made him dangerous. Id.
10. Id. at 71-72. State psychiatrists gave the defendant 200 milligrams of Thorazine, an antip.
sychotic drug, three times a day. Id. This dosage exceeds the amount of this drug "generally suffi-
cient" for "acutely agitated, manic, or disturbed" hospitalized psychiatric patients. PHYSICIAN'S
DESK REFERENCE 1934 (41st ed. 1987).
11. Ake, 470 U.S. at 71.
12. Id.
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The court rejected the request and proceeded to trial.1 3
At trial the only issue was Ake's sanity at the time of the offense. Defend-
ant was unable to present any expert evidence supporting an insanity defense
because he could not pay for an independent psychiatric examination.1 4 The
court instructed the jury that defendant bore the burden of raising a reasonable
doubt about his sanity.15 The jury rejected Ake's insanity defense, found him
guilty of all charges, and sentenced him to death. 16 The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed. 17
The United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction. 18 The Court
declared that when a state brings its judicial power to bear on an individual in a
criminal proceeding, it must assure that the defendant has "a fair opportunity to
present his defense."' 9 The Court held that the source of the state's obligation is
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
This elementary principle, grounded in significant part on the Four-
teenth Amendment's due process guarantee of fundamental fairness,
derives from the belief that justice cannot be equal where, simply as a
result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to partici-
pate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his liberty is at
stake.20
Citing cases in which the Court had declared indigent defendants entitled to
assistance at state expense in criminal proceedings, 2 1 the Court held that a crim-
inal trial may be fundamentally unfair if the defendant does not have "access to
the raw materials integral to the building of an effective defense."' 22 The Court
said, however, that 'the state need not "purchase for the indigent all the assist-
ance that his wealthier counterpart might buy."' 23 On the contrary, the Court
13. The trial court rejected the request based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States
ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561 (1953). Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
14. Ake, 470 U.S. at 72. Defense counsel called the psychiatrists who had examined the defend-
ant at the state hospital as witnesses, but they were unable to offer any evidence on the defendant's
sanity at the time of the offense because they had not evaluated him for that purpose. Id.
15. Id. at 73.
16. Id. at 72-73. In the sentencing phase of the trial, the doctors who examined defendant at
the state hospital testified that defendant posed a danger to society. Due to the court's refusal to
grant defendant's motion for psychiatric assistance, defendant was unable to present any testimony
in rebuttal. Defendant was sentenced to death "on each of the two murder charges and to 500 years
of imprisonment on each of the two counts of shooting with intent to kill." Id. at 73.
17. Ake v. State, 663 P.2d 1 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), rev'd sub. nom. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470
U.S. 68 (1985).
18. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87. Justice Marshall wrote the majority opinion, id. at 70-87; Chief
Justice Burger concurred in the judgment, id. at 87 (Burger, C.J., concurring); and Justice Rehnquist
dissented, id. at 87-92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
19. Id. at 76.
20. Id.
21. Id. The types of assistance noted by the Court included: blood grouping tests to determine
paternity in a "quasi-criminal" paternity action, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981); the assistance
of counsel on a first appeal of right, Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); the assistance of
counsel at trial, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); the filing of a notice of appeal without
paying a filing fee, Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); and a trial transcript on a first appeal of right
if the transcript is necessary to a decision on the merits, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
22. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
23. Id.
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reaffirmed the limits on the rights of indigents to assistance at state expense it
had imposed in earlier cases. 24 The goal was merely to ensure that indigent
defendants have the basic tools for an adequate defense.25 To determine
whether the fourteenth amendment requires a particular tool for an adequate
defense, the Ake Court used the three-factor balancing test announced in Ma-
thews v. Eldridge.26 The Court applied the Mathews test by considering the fol-
lowing factors:
The first [factor] is the private interest that will be affected by the ac-
tion of the State. The second is the governmental interest that will be
affected if the safeguard is to be provided. The third is the probable
value of the additional or substitute procedural safeguards that are
sought, and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the affected interest
if those safeguards are not provided.27
Having grounded the debate firmly in the context of due process, 28 the
Court proceeded to balance the three Mathews factors. The Court characterized
24. For example, in Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974), the Court held that neither the due
process clause nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment entitle a convicted de-
fendant to counsel at state expense on discretionary appeals to the highest state court or to the
United States Supreme Court. Id. at 618-19. According to the Ross Court, the fourteenth amend-
ment "does not require absolute equality or precisely equal advantages" or equal economic condi-
tions; rather, equal protection merely requires that "indigents have an adequate opportunity to
present their claims fairly within the adversary system." Id. at 612. This interpretation limits the
reach of equal protection for indigent criminal defendants to no more than due process affords and
undercuts support for arguments based on principles of equality rather than systemic fairness, See
Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional Mandate of Ake v.
Oklahoma, 84 MicH. L. REv. 1326, 1335-36 (1986); see also The Supreme Court, 1984 Term-
Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 120, 139-40 (1985) [hereinafter Leading Cases] (Ake is indicative
of the Supreme Court's submergence of the broader, wealth-oriented equal protection analysis into
due process doctrine); Comment, Criminal Procedure-Narrowing the Rights of Future Indigent
Criminal Defendants in the Name of Due Process, 16 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 417, 428-29 (1986)
(Court's view of right announced in Ake through due process rather than equal protection lens
lowers burden on states attempting to justify procedures in cases of indigent criminal defendants).
25. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
26. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
27. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77. Litigants have argued that the Mathews balancing test should not
apply to liberty interests and is appropriate only when property interests are at stake. See Lassiter v.
Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 59-60 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). But cf. Schall v.
Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 275-81 (1984) (pretrial detention for juveniles approved; procedural safe-
guards adequate under Mathews). The due process balancing approach seems fraught with ambigu-
ity "due to the easy manipulability of the factors to be balanced and the difficulty of comparing
them." Note, supra note 24, at 1332 n.41; see also Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance: Ake
v. Oklahoma, 21 TULSA L.J. 121, 127 n.47 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Due Process and Psychiatric
Assistance] (values and assumptions underlying due process balancing test left unarticulated). Other
commentators argue that the Mathews approach is desirable because it is flexible, allowing courts to
respond to the particular facts of a given situation appropriately. See Note, The Right to a Partisan
Psychiatric Expert: Might Indigency Preclude Insanity?, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 703, 729 n.177 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert].
28. The Court ignored sources other than the equal protection and due process clauses that
might support the right to a psychiatrist at state expense. Alternative sources include the sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, see Decker, Expert Services in the Defense of
Criminal Cases: The Constitutional and Statutory Rights of Indigents, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 574, 593-
94 (1982) (arguing that because criminal defendants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel,
defendants are also entitled to defense services that such counsel would employ); see also United
States v. Fessel, 531 F.2d 1275, 1278-79 (5th Cir. 1976) (defense counsel's failure to request psychiat-
ric assistance for client constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel); the sixth amendment right to
confrontation of witnesses against the accused, Note, supra note 24, at 1352-60; and the right to
compulsory process, see People v. Watson, 36 Ill. 2d 228, 232-34, 221 N.E.2d 645, 648 (1966).
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the first factor, the private interest, as the interest in the accuracy of criminal
proceedings that place an individual's life or liberty at risk. The Court found
that this interest is "almost uniquely compelling" and that it must be accorded
great weight.29 The Court analyzed the second factor, the interest of the state,
exclusively in terms of the financial burden that the right would create.30 Many
states, the Court noted, already provided psychiatric services to criminal defend-
ants and did not find the burden excessive. 3 1
In evaluating the third Mathews factor, the probable value of psychiatric
assistance and the risk of error without that assistance, the Court examined the
"pivotal role" psychiatry plays in any criminal proceeding in which the defend-
ant's mental state is an issue.32 The Court noted that the federal government
and many states already had recognized the importance of psychiatry by provid-
ing psychiatric assistance in certain circumstances. 33 According to the Ake
Court, a psychiatrist can perform many important tasks for the defendant, in-
cluding interviewing and examining the defendant, analyzing her mental state,
presenting this information to the jury in an understandable fashion, and assist-
ing counsel with cross-examination. 34
The nature of psychiatry itself further magnifies the importance of the
assistance of psychiatric experts. Psychiatrists often disagree on diagnoses and
the likelihood of future dangerousness; 35 "there often is no single, accurate psy-
chiatric conclusion on legal insanity in a given case."'36 For these reasons, states
(and defendants who can afford psychiatrists) utilize psychiatric testimony when
mental state is at issue.37 It would be unfair for a court to find that an indigent
29. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78.
30. Id. at 78-79.
31. Id. at 78 n.4.
32. Id. at 79. Not everyone agrees that psychiatry should have such a pivotal role. See Ziskin
& Faust, Preface to J. ZISKIN & D. FAUST, COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL
TESTIMONY xv (4th ed. 1986) (despite the ever increasing reliance on psychiatric and psychological
evidence in the legal process, this evidence often does not meet reasonable criteria of admissibility; if
admitted, it should be given little or no weight).
33. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 78 n.4 (survey of state statutes that provide psychiatric assistance to
indigent defendants).
34. Id. at 80.
35. There is wide disagreement on the value of psychiatric predictions of future dangerousness.
The Supreme Court has disregarded the American Psychiatric Association's view that psychiatric
testimony as to future dangerousness is fundamentally unreliable. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454,
472-73 (1981). According to the Association, psychiatrists possess no special qualifications for mak-
ing such predictions. Id. at 473 (quoting THE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIA-
TION TASK FORCE ON CLINICAL ASPECTS OF THE VIOLENT INDIVIDUAL 23-30, 33 (1974)); see also
Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert, supra note 27, at 717-24 (judgments regarding
sanity of criminal defendants are "without parallel" outside the context of the criminal justice sys-
tem; although perceived as reliable, psychiatry relies to a great extent on subjective, inferential data
and interpretations derived therefrom); Note, An Indigent's Constitutional Right to Expert Psychiat-
ric Assistance: Ake v. Oklahoma, 39 Sw. L.J. 957, 963 n.62 (1985) [hereinafter Note, An Indigent's
Constitutional Right] (wide disagreement and skepticism exists concerning the reliability of, and
proper role for, psychiatry in the criminal justice system); Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assist-
ance, supra note 27, at 152-53 (the "subtle but persistent" influence of extra-scientific factors on
psychiatric examinations makes psychiatry suspect as a reliable and impartial science).
36. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81.
37. Id. at 81-82.
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defendant is not entitled to this type of assistance.38
In light of these facts, the Court found the risk of an inaccurate resolution
of the sanity issue without the assistance of a psychiatrist unacceptably high.3 9
With psychiatric assistance, however, the defendant might present enough infor-
mation to the jury for it to make a sensible determination. 40 Thus, the Court
concluded that:
[W]hen a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at
the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State
must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psy-
chiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in
evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. . . . [T]he
indigent defendant [does not have] a constitutional right to choose a
psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own.
[The Court's] concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a
competent psychiatrist... and ... leave[s] to the States the decision on
how to implement this right.41
Finally, the Court determined that Ake had established that sanity was likely to
be a significant factor in his defense and that, therefore, the trial court should
have provided psychiatric assistance to him.42
Before leaving the discussion of Ake, several points are worth emphasizing.
First, although the Court declared that a defendant must show that sanity will
be a significant factor at trial, it made no attempt to give trial and appellate
courts guidance on the quantum of proof necessary for this showing.43 Second,
the Court emphasized that a psychiatrist is important to a defendant not only to
perform and report upon a mental examination, but also to render more compre-
hensive assistance in the overall development of the defendant's case. 44 Third,
as with other constitutional guarantees in the area of criminal procedure, the
Court gave states the freedom to implement the right in any way that comports
with the constitutional mandate. 45
38. Id. at 82.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 83. The Court then applied the Mathews test to the facts of the case and held that
defendant was unjustly denied a means of offering testimony to rebut the State's evidence regarding
his future dangerouseness. Id. at 83-84.
42. Id. at 86-87. The record upon which the trial court based its determination reflected the
following facts: the defendant's sole defense was insanity, id. at 72; his behavior at arraignment was
so bizarre that the trial court itself ordered him examined for competency, id. at 71; and he was
found competent to stand trial only after initially having been found incompetent and then becoming
mentally stable under large daily doses of an antipsychotic drug. Id. at 71-72. Further, the examin-
ing psychiatrist told the trial court that the defendant's illness was particularly severe just six months
after the offense and that it may have existed for years. Id. at 71. In addition, the defendant was
tried in a state that places the initial burden of proof for insanity on the defendant. Id. at 72-73.
43. This situation is not unlike the Court's treatment of due process in other contexts. Due
process "has never been, and perhaps can never be, precisely defined." Lassiter v. Department of
Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-25 (1981).
44. The Court gave mixed signals concerning the psychiatrist's role with regard to a criminal
defendant, resulting in lower court disagreement on the proper interpretation oflke on this point.
See Ake, 470 U.S. at 79-83; infra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
45. This approach is not unusual in the area of criminal procedure. In addition to the sixth
amendment right to assistance of counsel noted in Ake, 470 U.S. at 76, the Court has also granted
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II. LOWER COURT DECISIONS AFTER AKE
Cases decided since Ake reveal two patterns. First, lower courts have inter-
preted the "significant factor" test in ways that make it difficult for indigents to
obtain the services of a psychiatrist. Second, courts are answering requests for
psychiatric assistance by referring indigent defendants to a single psychiatrist or
state hospital.
A. Interpretations of "Significant Factor"
Many courts have interpreted Ake's significant factor test quite narrowly.
For example, in Moore v. Kemp,46 the court required that defendant show before
trial that the trial would be fundamentally unfair if an expert was not provided.
In effect, this rule required pretrial proof of a prima facie mental defect defense
without the benefit of expert help.
In Moore, the State relied on the testimony of both a microanalyst and a
serologist to prove defendant's guilt.47 In affirming the denial of defendant's
motion for an expert witness, 48 the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit set out its interpretation of Ake:49
[A] defendant must show the trial court that there exists a reasonable
probability both that an expert would be of assistance to the defense
and that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally
unfair trial.... [H]e must inform the court of the nature of the prose-
cution's case and how the requested expert would be useful. At the
very least, he must inform the trial court about the nature of the crime
and the evidence linking him to the crime .... [and] demonstrate a
substantial basis for [any affirmative defense with which the defendant
needs expert help.] ... [T]he defendant [also] should inform the court
why the particular expert is necessary.50
Thus, under Moore, the defendant must show not only that the expert would
assist the defense, but also that denial of the expert would result in an unfair
the states discretionary implementation in the fifth amendment context. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436 (1966), the Court stated that a criminal defendant undergoing custodial interrogation must
receive warnings regarding his fifth amendment rights, but that any warnings "fully as effective" as
those the Court described would be sufficient. Id. at 490.
46. 809 F.2d 702 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
47. Id. at 706.
48. The expert sought in Moore was not a psychiatrist but a "criminologist or other expert
witness" to assist in preparing and presenting of the defense. Id. at 709. The court analyzed the case
in the context of Ake, making no distinction on the basis of the type of expert. This approach seems
correct. As the court in Moore pointed out, all experts can serve two basic purposes. The expert can
help counsel address the opposition's evidence, including other expert witnesses, and fashion a the-
ory of defense. Id. In addition, the expert can provide testimony to establish an affirmative defense
or rebut prosecution evidence. Id. These purposes echo the Supreme Court's recitation of the roles
a psychiatrist can play for the defense in the sanity context. Ake, 470 U.S. at 80-81.
49. Moore, 809 F.2d at 712. The Court based its holding on both Ake and Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi, 472 U.S. 320, 324 n.1 (1985). Moore, 809 F.2d at 712.
50. Moore, 809 F.2d at 712 (omitting footnote analogizing requirement that defendant show
that expert would be of assistance to requirement that indigent defendant wishing to obtain the
issuance of a subpoena at government expense make a showing that witness is necessary to an ade-
quate defense under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(b)).
1990]
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trial.5 1 The defendant must also furnish the court with specifics about the
State's case and provide a substantial basis for any defense for which he wishes
the expert's help.5 2
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has adopted a
variation of the Moore standard, interpreting Ake to require that the defendant
present a prima facie case of insanity in order to obtain an expert.5 3 In Cart-
wright v. Maynard54 defense counsel moved for a complete psychological evalu-
ation after an evaluation of defendant limited to a determination of his
competency to stand trial, that is, his ability to assist in his own defense at
trial.5 5 Defendant claimed that he suffered from blackouts and had experienced
a blackout at the time of the crime.56 Interpreting Ake's significant factor test,
the Tenth Circuit stated that if sanity or mental capacity is to be an issue, the
defendant must establish the genuineness of these issues by a clear showing. The
court required that "for a defendant's mental state to become a substantial
threshold issue, the showing must be clear and genuine, one that constitutes a
'close' question... [that must be] fairly debatable or in doubt." T57 The court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a complete
evaluation based not only on the facts of record when the pretrial motion was
made, but also on facts adduced at trial that were "indicative of premeditation
and awareness." s58 Given all of these facts, the court reasoned that the blackout
defense was not credible and therefore was not a significant factor at trial.5 9
51. Id. at 712.
52. Id. Other courts have employed the Moore standard. See Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d
1240, 1244 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2857 (1988); Messer v. Kemp, 831 F.2d 946, 960
(11th Cir. 1987), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988); Crawford v. State, 257 Ga. 681, -, 362 S.E.2d
201, 205-06 (1987), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1098 (1989). By way of comparison, the Supreme Court
of North Carolina requires the defendant to prove that the expert would be of assistance or that
without the assistance sought the defendant would be deprived of a fair trial. See State v. Johnson,
317 N.C. 193, 198, 344 S.E.2d 775, 778 (1986).
53. See Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211-14 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (1987) (en banc), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
54. 802 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (1987) (en
bane), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988).
55. Id. at 1212.
56. Id. at 1209, 1212-13. The Cartwright opinion quotes an affidavit and a letter from a psy-
chologist indicating a strong possibility that defendant suffered from a psychological or neurological
disorder at the time of the offense and thereafter. It was therefore quite possible that defendant was
experiencing a loss of memory and ability to control his behavior at the time of the offense, Id. at
1209-10. It appears that this information was not before the trial court at the time the motion was
made. Id. at 1209.
57. Id. at 1211.
58. Id. at 1213. Those facts included evidence that the defendant had sneaked into the victims'
home, stalked and shot them, called his girlfriend from the residence, and then cut the telephone
wire. Id.
59. Id. at 1213-14. Volson v. Blackburn, 794 F.2d 173 (5th Cir. 1986), echoes the reasoning in
Cartwright. In Volson defendant changed his plea from a simple not guilty to not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity, and requested appointment of a statutory "sanity commission" of physi-
cians to examine him. Id. at 175. When the court denied the request, the defendant withdrew the
insanity plea. Id. He was found guilty of aggravated rape. Id. Though the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit spoke less broadly in Volson than the Tenth Circuit did in Cartwright, Volson also
required the defendant to meet a high standard. The Volson standard requires that:
the defendant, at a minimum, make allegations supported by a factual showing that the
defendant's sanity is in fact at issue in the case .... [The defendant] has not alleged any
INDIGENT PSYCHIATRIC ASSISTANCE
Thus, Cartwright requires that the defendant show a prima facie case of insanity
and prove that denial of the expert's assistance caused actual prejudice. State
courts in Alabama,60  Arkansas, 6 1  Louisiana,62  North Carolina, 63  and
Oklahoma" have used similar standards.
The interpretations of Ake's significant factor test in Moore and Cartwright
make the right to a psychiatric expert an unattainable luxury for many indigent
defendants-precisely the problem the Supreme Court tried to rectify in Ake.
The Moore test and its variants 65 raise a number of difficulties for the indigent
defendant, some of which may be insurmountable.
Moore requires that a defendant show 1) that the assistance of an expert
would help the defense, and 2) that absence of the requested help would render
the trial fundamentally unfair.66 In the insanity context, this is akin to present-
ing a prima facie case of insanity.67 The defendant must make these showings
before trial, without the benefit of an expert's help. The reasoning behind this
rule is flawed. To get the expert, the defendant must show what the expert can
do for him; without the expert, the defendant may be unable to demonstrate the
expert's potential importance. Given the complexity of psychiatry, defense
counsel may be ill equipped to show the court how the trial would be fundamen-
tally unfair without the expert's help. Moore therefore creates a difficulty similar
to that facing a defendant who attempts to show, in hindsight, that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to call a witness at
actual prejudice as a result of the trial court's failure to appoint a sanity commission or
other medical experts .... [Therefore, the defendant] has not carried his burden of alleg-
ing, much less demonstrating, prejudice as a result of the state trial court's action.
Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
60. See Whittle v. State, 518 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (defendant found compe-
tent to stand trial and sane at time of offense; trial court's denial of any further evaluation held
proper since there were no reasonable grounds to doubt sanity).
61. See Wall v. State, 289 Ark. 570, 572, 715 S.W.2d 208, 209 (1986) (denial of defendant's
motion for psychiatric assistance proper because defendant failed to show that sanity was seriously
in question).
62. See State v. Foster, 510 So. 2d 717, 726 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (Ake requires, at a minimum,
.,a prima facie showing that defendant's sanity was a crucial factor" in the defense), vacated on other
grounds, 519 So. 2d 138 (La. 1988).
63. See State v. Massey, 316 N.C. 558, 563, 342 S.E.2d 811, 814 (1986) (experts provided only
when it is reasonably likely that the expert will aid materially in preparation and presentation of the
defense, or when, without the expert, the defendant will not receive a fair trial) (quoting State v.
Gardner, 311 N.C. 489, 498-99, 319 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1984)).
64. Brown v. State, 743 P.2d 133, 137 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987). According to the Oklahoma
court, the defendant is entitled to a psychiatrist only if he puts forth "allegations... undergirded
with evidentiary support and particularized facts showing that the defendant's sanity at the time of
the offense was seriously in question." Id. The court cited Cartwright for this proposition. Id. This
confuses the Ake standard, which requires the defendant to show that his sanity will be a significant
factor at trial.
65. Many cases other than those already discussed heighten the Ake standard. For some of
these cases, see Note, After Ake" Implementing the Tools of an Adequate Defense, 7 PACE L. REv.
201, 246-47 & nn.251-52 (1986) and cases cited therein.
66. Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
67. Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct. 1853 (1988). The Cartwright court affirmed lower
court findings that defendant had failed to establish that his sanity "was a viable issue upon which
Cartwright could have based his defense." Id. Thus, the defendant must show not only that sanity
might be a significant factor at trial, but that it forms the basis of a viable defense.
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trial.68 A defendant is hard pressed to demonstrate prejudice-because the wit-
ness did not testify, a defendant cannot show what the witness would have
said. 69
Another difficulty that the Moore standard creates is that in order for the
defendant to show that his trial would be fundamentally unfair without the
assistance of the expert he must predict what will occur at trial. The defendant
must foresee not only his defense but the model of the government's case as
well-its physical evidence, its witnesses, the experts it may call, and what the
experts may say. Only by comparing the government's case to the defense case,
both with and without the benefit of expert assistance, can the defendant answer
the question whether he can receive a fair trial without the expert's help. The
defendant is in a particularly poor position to make this showing prior to trial,
when he must make the motion for appointment of the expert. 70 Although dis-
covery in some jurisdictions discloses portions of the government's case,71 this is
by no means always true. Rules mandating what the government must disclose
in discovery, even with regard to expert testimony, vary greatly. 72 Even under
68. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984) (requiring defendants to show
that counsel was so ineffective as to not be acting as counsel and that actual prejudice resulted).
69. See Dufour v. Mississippi, 479 U.S. 891 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari). In Dufour an indigent defendant alleged ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel
failed to request appointment of a psychiatrist to assist in developing psychological evidence for
submission during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Id. at 892 (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari). Because defendant obtained no expert services on the subject of mitigation, he
was unable to demonstrate how such services might have helped his cause. In his dissent from the
denial of certiorari, Justice Marshall observed that "the prejudice standard in such a circumstance is
insurmountable; prejudice cannot be shown because the alleged error of counsel was in failing to seek
the appointment of an expert without whose assistance the evidence which would show prejudice
cannot be brought to light." Id. at 893 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). The
Moore standard presents the same obstacle-the defendant is in no position prospectively to show
why his trial would be fundamentally unfair without the assistance he seeks. One commentary on
Strickland v. Washington is particularly illuminating:
[T1he Court characterized trial counsel's decision to forego ... an examination [of defend-
ant's mental state] as ... a plausible strategic choice. How, though, could trial counsel
have come to this "plausible" choice without at least requesting such an examination?...
[T1o merely suggest-without supporting authority-that counsel could have "surmise[d]"
from his own conversation with defendant "that psychological evidence would be of little
help" begs the question.
Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal Defendant, Psychiatric Testimony in
Death Penalty Cases, and the Power of Symbolism: Dulling the Ake in Barefoot' Achilles' Heel, 3
N.Y.L. HUM. RTs. ANN. 91, 158-59 (1985) (footnotes omitted).
70. See Note, Criminal Procedure: The Constitutional Extent of the Adequate Tools of a De-
fense, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 273, 285 (1986) ("The determination of whether an expert is necessary to
help the jury in a particular case is more difficult before or during trial than is the hindsight appellate
determination."(footnote omitted)).
71. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (requiring government to disclose defendant's own state-
ments, grand jury testimony and prior record, documents and tangible objects, and reports of exami-
nations and scientific tests); FLA. R. CRIM P. 3.220 (requiring prosecution to disclose, among other
things, written statements of persons having relevant information and reports or statements of ex-
perts, including scientific tests, and allowing defendant to depose any person having relevant infor-
mation); MD. R.P. 4-263 (requiring state to disclose exculpatory material, any information relevant
to searches, seizures, wiretaps, statements of defendants and pretrial identification, names of state's
witnesses, co-defendant's statements, reports of experts, evidence to be used at trial, and property of
defendant).
72. See SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 4, at 35-49 (comparing state discovery rules); see also
Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.2d 702, 712 n.10 (11 th Cir.) (en bane) ("In ajurisdiction still employing 'trial
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relatively liberal rules of discovery, however, there may be many gaps in the
defense's understanding of the govetnment's case until the trial itself.73 These
gaps may make it impossible as a practical matter to show that the trial will be
fundamentally unfair without the expert.
Another problem with Moore is that when appellate courts use the funda-
mentally unfair standard, defendants face an even heavier burden than they did
at the trial level. Appellate courts, looking back at a trial record, will determine
whether the trial was fundamentally unfair in light of the facts adduced at trial,
not just from the record as it existed when the pretrial motion for expert assist-
ance was made.74
Appellate review of a request for a court-appointed psychiatrist under the
fundamentally unfair standard is incorrect. The defendant's attempt to show
that sanity will be a significant factor precedes trial.75 Based on the facts defense
counsel puts on the record at the pretrial stage, the trial court grants or denies
the request for an expert. 76 Ake thus implies that a reviewing court should con-
fine itself to examining the facts before the trial court when the motion was
made. 77 Facts and testimony that emerged only later, at trial, should not come
into play when the appellate court reviews the trial court's denial of the request
for an expert.78
Close scrutiny of Ake shows that lower courts err when they require the
defendant to show that denial of expert assistance will result in a fundamentally
unfair trial. In Ake the Court held that when an indigent shows that sanity
could be a significant factor at trial, the defendant is entitled to a psychiatric
expert, 79 because without the expert, the trial would be presumed fundamentally
unfair and violative of due process.80 Put another way, if the defendant shows
psychiatry to be a "'basic tool[] of an adequate defense,' ",81 deprivation of the
by ambush,' the defendant might have to ask the court to make the prosecutor disclose the theory of
his case and the results of any tests .... "), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987).
73. For example, although MD. R.P. 4-263 requires disclosure of the names of witnesses, it does
not require that the defendant receive any information concerning any statements the witnesses have
made. It therefore may be difficult to evaluate the witnesses' importance, especially for indigent
defendants lacking resources to interview the witnesses.
74. See, e.g., Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1212-14 (10th Cir. 1986) (defendant
moved for expert assistance to help raise defense of unconsciousness during commission of crime; in
light of testimony of defendant and another witness at trial concerning defendant's mental state, Ake
threshold not crossed), rev'd in part on other grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (1987) (en bane), aff'd, 486
U.S. 356 (1988).
75. See, e.g., id. at 1210-14 (affirming district court's denial of request for appointment of psy-
chiatrist because defendant failed to make preliminary showing that his sanity would be a factor at
trial).
76. See id. at 1211.
77. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 86 (Court applies announced standard to facts available pretrial).
78. This is not to say that the failure to grant a defense motion for expert assistance could never
be considered harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). It may be that in
light of all the evidence, the government could show beyond a reasonable doubt that failure to grant
the motion did not contribute to the verdict. Id. at 23-24. However, considering the evidence re-
ceived at trial in the context of whether denial of the pretrial motion was correct (as opposed to
harmless) seems, at best, doctrinally incorrect.
79. Ake, 470 U.S. at 86-87.
80. Id. at 84.
81. Id. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
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expert witness renders the trial unfair. Requiring the defendant to show that the
trial would be unfair without the expert's help stands the Court's analysis on its
head.
B. Referrals Limited to One Expert
Appellate decisions since Ake ir~dicate that trial courts often have limited
indigent defendants to one psychiatric examination or have refused to appoint a
defense psychiatrist, regardless of the facts before the trial court. As a result,
many defendants receive insufficient psychiatric assistance or none at all.
When sanity issues arise, many courts refer defendants to psychiatrists, usu-
ally at state mental or psychiatric hospitals, to determine competence to stand
trial or sanity at the time of the offense. Courts have done this in response to
defendants' motions for psychiatric assistance,82 sua sponte,83 or as a matter of
state procedure following notice by a defendant of intent to rely on the insanity
defense. 84 The result usually has been that the defendant is found sane and
competent to stand trial.85 When the defendant subsequently has moved for the
appointment of a defense psychiatrist, the court usually has denied the motion
regardless of what else appears in the record to support it. These courts have
reasoned that Ake merely entitles the defendant to an evaluation by "one compe-
tent psychiatrist."'86 Because Ake specifically held that the defendant has no
constitutional right to a psychiatrist of his own choosing or to funds with which
to hire his own,87 and because the implementation of the decision was left to the
states,88 these courts have decided that referring the defendant to the state hos-
pital for a single psychiatric evaluation is acceptable. If a state psychiatrist finds
the defendant sane, these courts conclude that sanity cannot be a significant
factor at trial, even if other evidence before the court draws sanity into question.
82. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323-24 n.1 (1985).
83. The best example of this is probably Ake itself, in which the trial court referred defendant to
a state hospital for evaluation upon observing his "bizarre" behavior during his pretrial arraignment.
Ake, 470 U.S. at 71.
84. See, e.g., Dunn v. State, 291 Ark. 131, 133, 722 S.W.2d 595, 596 (1987) (defendant ordered
evaluated for competency to stand trial and for sanity at time of offense upon raising of mental
disease or defect defense, pursuant to ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-605 (repealed 1977)); Djadi v. State, 72
Md. App. 223, 226, 528 A.2d 502, 503 (1987) (pursuant to defendant's plea of not criminally respon-
sible, court ordered an evaluation of defendant at state hospital, as authorized under MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-110(a) (Supp. 1989)), cert. denied, 311 Md. 285, 533 A.2d 1307 (1987).
85. Some find unsurprising the fact that doctors at state hospitals almost uniformly evaluate
defendants as competent and sane because state hospitals are "notoriously overcrowded," resulting
in psychiatrists spending inadequate time with each defendant. Note, Due Process and Psychiatric
Assistance, supra note 27, at 145-46. These hospitals are usually staffed by clinical (i.e., treatment-
oriented) and not forensic psychiatrists; thus the examiner is unable either to effectively evaluate
defendant for legal purposes or to assist in trial preparation and presentation. Id. at 145-46, Foren-
sic psychiatrists possess a knowledge and training of both psychiatry and the law. Id. at 146; see also
Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of
Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM J.L. & MED. 407 (1983) (discussing Dr.
James Grigson, who has testified in support of defendants' future dangerousness in more than 70
capital punishment cases).
86. Ake, 470 U.S. at 78-79.
87. Id. at 83.
88. Id.
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This reasoning appears in opinions of federal courts8 9 as well as the courts of
Alabama,90 Arkansas, 9 1 California,92 Florida,9 3 Louisiana, 94 Maryland, 9
5
89. For example, in Glass v. Blackburn, 791 F.2d 1165 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
1985 (1987), defendant was found sane at the time of the crime by at least one member of a state-
appointed sanity commission. Id. at 1168. The other member of the commission implicitly attested
to defendant's sanity. Id. The court held the defendant was not entitled to an independent psychiat-
ric examination, notwithstanding that commission members could not serve the purposes outlined in
Ake. Id. at 1169. In another example, Magwood v. Smith, 791 F.2d 1438 (1 1th Cir. 1986), defendant
was examined by two local doctors and by a state-appointed lunacy commission made up of three
physicians. Id. at 1440. The lunacy commission found defendant presently insane and probably
insane at the time of the murder; the other doctors disagreed. Id. The court held that sanity was a
significant factor at trial, but that defendant's request for appointment of a psychiatrist to assist with
preparation and presentation of defense was denied properly, even though psychiatric testimony
"might have been desirable." Id. at 1443. The court expressly held that Ake's constitutional re-
quirements had been met. Id.
90. In Bradford v. State, 512 So. 2d 134 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987), defendant initially was found
incompetent to stand trial by state hospital staff. Id. at 135. He was given "appropriate medical
treatment" and then found competent to stand trial. Id. A psychological evaluation found that
defendant had an I.Q. of 71, putting him in the borderline mentally retarded range. Id. The court
found that defendant's motion for independent evaluation of sanity at the time of the offense was
properly denied regardless of the fact that there had been no such evaluation, because an indigent
has no right to choose his own psychiatrist or to obtain funds to hire his own. Id. In Holmes v.
State, 497 So. 2d 1149 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986), a court-appointed psychiatrist initially found defend-
ant competent to stand trial but did not evaluate defendant's sanity at the time of the crime. Id. at
1150. The appellate court found that the trial court properly denied a subsequent motion for evalua-
tion of sanity at the time of the crime, despite defendant's mental retardation and the prior psychiat-
ric evaluation showing borderline intelligence, because the competency evaluation did not find any
psychiatric disorder. Furthermore, a defendant is not entitled to funds to hire the psychiatrist of his
choice. Id. at 1151. The court failed to take into account the fact that a competency evaluation
would not touch on the issue of sanity at the time of the offense.
91. In Wall v. State, 289 Ark. 570, 715 S.W.2d 208 (1986), defendant moved for a psychiatrist
and a psychologist to assist in the preparation and presentation of an insanity defense after a state
hospital found him sane at the time of the offense. Id. at 572, 715 S.W.2d at 208. The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the trial court had properly denied this assistance because the defendant's
rights were adequately protected by an examination at the state hospital and because defendant's
showing as to his right to a psychiatrist was insufficient. Id. at 572, 714 S.W.2d at 209. The court
reached this conclusion despite the fact that the examination disclosed that defendant suffered from
a dysthymic disorder, a mixed personality disorder, and passive-aggressive traits. Id. at 571, 715
S.W.2d at 208.
92. In People v. Young, 189 Cal. App. 3d 891, 234 Cal. Rptr. 819 (1987), court-appointed
psychiatrists found that defendant was suffering from chronic schizophrenia, delusions, hallucina-
tions, obsession, and compulsion. Id. at 897-98, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 822. Defendant's history included
attempted suicide by self-immolation, three prior diagnoses of schizophrenia, medication with com-
bination antipsychotic and antidepressant drug and other psychiatric treatment. Id. The trial court
denied defendant's motion to appoint a specified psychiatrist to assist defense counsel. Id. The
appellate court affirmed, in part because Ake does not require the appointment of the defendant's
choosing or the funds with which to hire his own. Id. at 902, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
93. In Rose v. State, 506 So. 2d 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), the court appointed doctors to
assist defendant with his insanity defense. Id. at 468-69. One doctor preliminarily diagnosed de-
fendant as suffering from episodic dyscontrol syndrome, but was unable to perform special confirm-
ing test for the syndrome. Id. The appellate court held that the trial court's refusal to appoint a
doctor to perform this special test was proper, because the right announced in Ake was limited to the
appointment of one competent psychiatrist. Id. at 471.
94. In State v. Foster, 510 So. 2d 717 (La. Ct. App. 1987), vacated in part on other grounds, 519
So. 2d 138 (La. 1988), defendant entered an insanity plea and was found competent to stand trial and
sane at the time of the offense by court-appointed doctors. Id. at 726. The court held that he was
not entitled to an appointment of an independent psychiatrist because, given the previous findings of
competence and sanity, sanity could not be a genuine issue. Id. at 726-27.
95. In Djadi v. State, 72 Md. App. 223, 528 A.2d 502, cert. denied, 311 Md. 285, 533 A.2d 1307
(1987) defendant submitted an insanity defense but was found competent and criminally responsible
by a state hospital despite a dysthymic disorder. Id. at 226, 528 A.2d at 503. The Maryland court
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Oklahoma, 96 and Virginia. 97
The conclusion the courts reach in these cases-that defendants examined
once have received all of the assistance to which they are entitled under Ake-is
often erroneous. The error seems to stem from ambiguities in Ake itself.98 The
Ake Court limited the defendant to "one competent psychiatrist"9 9 and denied
the defendant the right to choose a psychiatrist or to receive government funds
to hire his own. 10 Lower courts rely on this language in denying defense mo-
tions for further psychiatric assistance after an initial psychiatric evaluation. 101
The Supreme Court also indicated, however, that the expert appointed by the
trial court should not be a mere examining doctor, but rather should assist the
defendant in the preparation and presentation of the defense and in cross-exami-
nation of the government's psychiatric witnesses.10 2 This unresolved contradic-
tion 10 3 may account for the unwillingness of trial courts to allow the defendant a
psychiatric expert of her own choosing. The failure to do so is problematic in
several ways.
In cases of defendants found sane by appointed psychiatrists, courts con-
clude that sanity could not be a significant factor in the trial despite other evi-
dence suggesting that sanity should be at issue.104 These rulings confuse the
burden of showing that sanity is a significant factor with that of proving a prima
facie case of insanity and turn a blind eye to other facts supporting insanity as a
defense.
held that defendant was not entitled to an independent psychiatrist, because Ake only affords access
to one competent psychiatrist. Id. at 231, 528 A.2d at 506.
96. In Brown v. State, 743 P.2d 133 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987), the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that defendant was not entitled to a private psychiatrist despite the determination by a
state hospital doctor finding defendant sufficiently paranoid that his ability to determine right from
wrong may have been affected. Id. at 135. The defendant was not entitled to a private psychiatrist,
because Ake does not give the defendant the right to a psychiatrist of his choice. Id. at 137.
97. In Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3220
(1987) the Virginia Supreme Court held that defendant was not entitled to a defense psychiatrist
even though a court-appointed doctor evaluated defendant for only one hour and the doctor lacked
competence in field of delayed stress syndrome. Id. at 275, 351 S.E.2d at 6. The court supported its
holding with the fact that Ake does not entitle a defendant to a psychiatrist of his personal choice or
to funds to hire his own. Id. at 276, 351 S.E. 2d at 7.
98. See Note, Due Process and Psychiatric Assistance, supra note 27, at 144-45 (having defend-
ant evaluated through state hospital systems will throw the tension between the two interpretations
of Ake into sharp relief).
99. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
100. Id. at 83.
101. See Cartwright v. Maynard, 802 F.2d 1203, 1211-14 (10th Cir. 1986), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 822 F.2d 1477 (1987), aff'd, 108 S. Ct 1853 (1988); supra notes 53-59 and accompanying
text.
102. See Leading Cases, supra note 24, at 136 (Ake's assurance of access to a psychiatrist "looks
very much like the right to a partisan expert, notwithstanding the Court's pronouncement to the
contrary"); Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert, supra note 27, at 709-10 (despite the
Court's contradictory language, "an analysis of the relationship between the constitutional basis for
the decision and the Court's approach to the role of psychiatry in the legal arena requires that the
contradiction be resolved in favor of a defendant's right to a partisan psychiatrist").
103. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 82, 83. Although the Court's opinion does not acknowledge this con-
tradiction, Justice Rehnquist points it out in his dissenting opinion. See id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J.
dissenting).
104. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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State v. Gambrell 10 5 contains a clear illustration of this erroneous reasoning
at the trial court level. In that case, doctors at a state hospital found that de-
fendant had "no mental defect or mental disorder which would have prevented
him from distinguishing right from wrong with respect to the current charge"
and explained defendant's visual and auditory hallucinations as a result of alco-
hol withdrawal syndrome. 10 6 The record showed that the state hospital had
found defendant to be in need of psychiatric care, that defendant was unable to
speak cogently with his counsel or to respond to questions posed to him in open
court, that the impressions of the professionals who admitted the defendant to
the state hospital were that defendant was suffering an acute psychosis, and that
defendant required treatment with psychotropic drugs upon discharge.1 0 7 Nev-
ertheless, the trial court denied defendant's motion for appointment of a psychi-
atrist to assist him. 10 8 The Supreme Court of North Carolina chastised the trial
court for taking this approach and pointed out the underlying flaw in the trial
court's interpretation of Ake:
[The trial court] should not base its ruling on the opinion of one psy-
chiatrist if there are other facts and circumstances casting doubt on
that opinion. The question under Ake is not whether defendant has
made aprimafacie showing of legal insanity. The question is whether,
under all the facts and circumstances known to the court at the time
the motion for psychiatric assistance is made, defendant has demon-
strated that his sanity when the offense was committed will be at trial a
significant factor. 109
Given these principles and the facts before the trial court, defendant made the
necessary threshold showing; the trial court should have appointed a psychia-
trist to assist in evaluating, preparing, and presenting the defense. 110 The psy-
chiatrist who examined defendant at the state hospital was not appointed for
these purposes and did not serve in these capacities.' 11
People v. Vale1 2 is also instructive. In Vale, defendant was initially hospi-
talized for mental and physical problems. He was found incompetent to stand
trial by two different doctors; only after a year of treatment did a third doctor
find defendant competent." 3 Defendant raised an insanity defense and re-
quested authorization to hire a psychiatrist to assist him.1 4 The record before
the trial court showed that defendant was found competent only after extended
105. 318 N.C. 249, 347 S.E.2d 390 (1986).
106. Id. at 254, 347 S.E.2d at 393.
107.- Id. at 257, 347 S.E.2d at 394. The record before the trial court also revealed that the
defendant had a family history of depression and mental illnesses, that one of the examining doctors
recommended that he receive follow-up care after discharge, and that the doctors at the state hospi-
tal determined, after the defendant had been in custody for approximately 10 weeks, that he was in
need of psychiatric care. At that time defendant appeared comatose. Id.
108. Id. at 255, 347 S.E.2d at 393.
109. Id. at 256, 347 S.E.2d at 394.
110. Id. at 259, 347 S.E.2d at 395.
111. Id.
112. 133 A.D.2d 297, 519 N.Y.S.2d 4 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
113. Id. at 297-98, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6.
114. Id. at 299, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
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hospitalization for psychiatric and serious physical ailments, that he had been
institutionalized five times in the two years immediately preceding trial, and that
his psychiatric difficulties dated back to childhood." 5 The trial court rejected
defendant's request for psychiatric assistance because the defense had failed "to
set forth any grounds for believing that such a defense might succeed." 116 The
reviewing court reversed, pointing out that a defense of insanity might be both a
significant factor at trial and an appropriate legal strategy, regardless of its
chances for success.' 17
[Ain indigent need not show that an insanity defense "might succeed"
to obtain access to expert psychiatric assistance, but only that the issue
of the defendant's sanity will be an important factor at the trial.
Possibly, defendant's chances of prevailing based on such a defense
were minimal, but that was not the issue before the court on the appli-
cation. Although perhaps unpromising, a mental defect defense was
defendant's best line of defense; and whether defendant had been sane
at the time of the offense was a question legitimately raised by the
record before the court.118
Thus, Grambell and Vale both demonstrate that when evidence supports an in-
sanity defense, the results of one evaluation should not preclude the appoint-
ment of a psychiatric expert to assist the defendant.
In addition to erring by relying on the results of an examination by a single
psychiatrist to determine whether sanity will be a significant factor, courts have
failed to realize that a single psychiatrist may not be able to fill the role the
Supreme Court set out in Ake. The psychiatrist is appointed not only to ex-
amine the defendant, but also to act as an expert witness by assisting in the
evaluation, preparation and presentation of the defense. 19 The Ake decision
emphasizes that the risk of an inaccurate determination on the sanity issue is
extremely high "without the assistance of a psychiatrist to conduct a profes-
sional examination on issues relevant to the defense, to help determine whether
the insanity defense is viable, to present testimony, and to assist in preparing the
cross-examination of the State's psychiatric witnesses."' 120 A doctor who has
found the defendant sane would have difficulty filling this role. A psychiatrist
who has reached a conclusion that undermines the defendant's insanity theory,
often under circumstances that give the state access to that conclusion,12 would
be a poor witness for the defendant. 122 This would put the defendant in the
115. Id. at 300, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
116. Id. at 299, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 6.
117. Id. at 300-01, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
118. Id. at 300-01, 519 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
119. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
120. Id. at 82.
121. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(B) (requiring that defense disclose reports of mental
examinations defendant intends to use at trial, when defendant requests discovery of same from the
government).
122. See Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert, supra note 27, at 725 (characterizing
expert who did not support defense position as failing to satisfy Ake, because in fact no actual assist-
ance would be provided).
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same position as Ake himself at his trial-wishing to put on an insanity defense,
but without the expert witness needed to do so. 123
The view that a single psychiatrist could fill all the roles the Supreme Court
outlined in Ake, regardless of the psychiatrist's conclusions, seems to apply the
model of the lawyer as advocate to the psychiatrist. Although lawyers may rep-
resent people and causes with which they disagree and advocate zealously for
clients regardless of their personal feelings, 124 the same is not necessarily true of
psychiatrists. The psychiatrist cannot be a strong advocate for a position that
she believes is incorrect, even though a basis for it may exist. 125 For this reason,
the better practice would be to read Ake as requiring the appointment of a "de-
fense psychiatrist," or allowing the defendant to choose his psychiatric witness
(though the latter is not, of course, constitutionally required by Ake 126).
Given these flaws in the Court's approach, the more accurate dispositions
sought by the Supreme Court in Ake are unlikely without the appointment of a
psychiatrist independent of the state. A psychiatrist who examines the defend-
ant and subsequently testifies concerning that examination may be asked by the
state to relate to the factfinder statements the defendant made to him, notwith-
standing the defendant's fifth amendment right against compelled self-incrimina-
tion. 127 The indigent defendant must make do with whatever the appointed
psychiatrist says, if the defendant chooses to call him as a witness. In contrast,
when a defendant hires his own expert, the expert's findings usually are not
123. When a psychiatrist finds a defendant sane despite evidence to the contrary and the court
refuses to appoint another, a defendant whose only defense is insanity must choose between present-
ing no psychiatrist or one who testifies against him. Id. at 728. This situation denies the defendant
the opportunity to participate fairly within the adversary system. Id. See Note, An Indigent's Con-
stitutional Right, supra note 35, at 964 (given current importance of psychiatric expertise, a defend-
ant unable to present psychiatric testimony on his own behalf "has little chance of succeeding with
an insanity defense"); see also Note, The Indigent's Right to an Adequate Defense: Expert and Investi-
gational Assistance in Criminal Proceedings [hereinafter Note, The Indigent's Right], 55 CORNELL L.
REV. 632, 632 (1969-70) (inability of indigent to develop defense adequately without expert assist-
ance is inconsistent with equal justice).
124. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2-29 (1979).
125. See, eg., S. HALLECK, LAWv IN THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHIATRY 198-99 (1980) ("There is
considerable agreement among psychiatrists ... that a psychiatrist can comfortably sustain a truly
adversarial role only until he is actually sworn .... When he takes the witness stand the psychiatrist
... should not be reluctant to reveal information that may be adverse to his client's interest.").
126. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83 (defendant does not have "a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist
of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own").
127. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 107 S. Ct. 2906 (1987). In Buchanan defendant relied on the
affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance and attempted to establish the defense by hav-
ing a social worker read from psychological evaluations made in connection with a previous arrest.
Id. at 2910. On cross-examination, the State was permitted to rebut this evidence by having the
social worker read from another evaluation prepared by a doctor following the arrest for the case for
which defendant was being tried. Id. at 2910-11. This evaluation was prepared for the purpose of
determining whether defendant could benefit from treatment and hospitalization at the time of the
arrest and set forth the doctor's general observation about defendant's mental state. Id. at 2911-12.
The Court ruled that this did not violate defendant's right against compelled self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment. Id. at 2912. If, the Court said, a defendant requests an evaluation or
presents psychiatric evidence, then "at the very least, the prosecution may rebut this presentation
with evidence from the reports of the examination that the defendant requested. The defendant
would have no Fifth Amendment privilege against the introduction of this psychiatric testimony by
the prosecution." Id. at 2917-18. The Court reasoned that since defense counsel in Buchanan joined
in a motion for the examination which produced the report that the state sought to use, and because
the defense based its entire mental status defense on the testimony of the social worker who read
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available to the state unless the defendant plans to offer the expert's testimony at
trial. 128 Thus, the wealthy defendant can keep adverse findings from the state
simply by not using them and by hiring another psychiatrist; the indigent de-
fendant does not have the same choice. An indigent defendant, knowing that
whatever he says to a psychiatrist can be used against him in court, will be less
than forthcoming with the psychiatrist appointed to assist him. This lack of
confidentiality erodes and may destroy the trust and respect required between
psychiatrist and defendant; the appointment of a psychiatrist in these circum-
stances becomes a useless exercise.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
The decisions of lower courts demonstrate that Ake's promise of attaining
"[m]eaningful access to justice" 129 for indigent defendants has not been fully
realized. The importance of this failure looms large, given the frequency with
which the issue arises in capital cases 130 and the increasing importance of expert
assistance in all criminal cases.131 The question remains: How should lower
courts implement Ake?
A. Interpret "Significant.Factor" in Terms of Reasonableness
Viewed in the larger context of what the Supreme Court attempted to ac-
complish in Ake, the Moore standard 132 and its variants seem unnecessarily
strict. While the right announced in Ake was based on the due process clause, 1 33
from psychological reports, the State was forced to present other psychological evidence in response,
and the report's introduction did not violate the fifth amendment. Id. at 2918.
The Court distinguished Buchanan from Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981). In Estelle, the
Court ruled that the State's use of psychiatric testimony at a capital sentencing proceeding-based in
part on the defendant's statements to a psychiatrist without benefit of Miranda warnings during a
court-ordered psychiatric evaluation-violated the defendant's right against compelled self-incrimi-
nation. Estelle, 451 U.S. at 469-70. When the psychiatrist in Estelle reported what the defendant
said, he became, in effect, a state agent repeating an unwarned statement made in a postarrest custo-
dial setting. Id. at 467. Buchanan was different, the Court said, because while the defense in Estelle
had neither requested the examination nor presented psychiatric testimony, the defense in Buchanan
had done both without the defendant testifying, leaving the State in the position of being unable to
respond if it could not use the information the psychiatrist obtained in his examination. Buchanan,
107 S. Ct. at 2917-18. These distinctions seem to be based not on considerations of whether the fifth
amendment had been violated, but upon a balancing of the defendant's right against compelled self-
incrimination against the State's interest in obtaining a guilty verdict. Some cases are more forth-
right about this goal. See United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc);
Pope v. United States, 372 F.2d 710, 720 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 392 U.S. 651 (1968), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971). As Ake teaches, the state's interest
in obtaining a guilty verdict is tempered; society has no interest in guilty verdicts per se but only in
accurate dispositions. Ake, 470 U.S. at 79.
128. See, eg., MD. R.P. 4-263(d)(2).
129. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
130. It has been argued, based on Chief Justice Burger's concurring opinion in Ake, that Ake
applies only in capital cases. See Isom v. State, 488 So. 2d 12, 13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986). This
interpretation seems incorrect, given the absence of any language in the majority opinion in Ake
limiting the holding to capital cases and the fact that no other Justice joined Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 87.
13 . See supra note 4.
132. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Moore standard).
133. See supra notes 19-38 and accompanying text.
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the opinion contains much equality-oriented language. 134 Indeed, the Ake
Court intended to carry forward the theme of "meaningful access to justice"
from its prior cases. 135 The Moore standard has exactly the opposite effect.
Although the Ake Court did not intend that the government purchase for the
indigent defendant all the assistance that a wealthy defendant might buy, 136 its
underlying aim was to reduce the role played by wealth in the determination of
guilt and innocence. 137 Moore's interpretation ofAke 138 retreats from this goal.
A reasonableness standard, akin to that adopted in Vassar v. Solem, 139
would fulfill the underlying policy objectives of Ake better than the Moore stan-
dard. The issue in Vassar was whether the trial court erred in denying the de-
fendant's request for a court-appointed expert psychologist to testify regarding
the voluntariness of defendant's confession.140 Reversing the district court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that "[a] defendant's
request for the use of an expert witness in preparation of his defense must be
measured by a standard of reasonableness and should be allowed when the facts
reasonably suggest that use of the expert would be beneficial to the accused in
preparing his case." 14 1 Unlike Moore,14 2 Vassar does not require that the de-
fendant prove prejudice or lack of a fair trial without the use of the expert.
Under Ake, a court should presume that a trial would be unfair if the defendant
does not receive expert assistance when the defendant's sanity is a significant
factor. 143 The reasonableness standard is consistent with this presumption.
134. See, eg., Ake, 470 U.S. at 76-77 (" [J]ustice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his
poverty, a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in
which his liberty is at stake.... [M]ere access to the courthouse doors does not by itself assure a
proper functioning of the adversary process.").
135. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77; see also Note, Criminal Procedure-Defendant's Due Process Right to a
Psychiatric Expert-Ake v. Oklahoma, 8 CAMPBELL L. REV. 323, 338 (1986) [hereinafter Defend-
ant's Due Process Right] (states must take steps to ensure "substantial equality" between indigents
and nonindigents in their implementation ofAke); Note, The Indigent's Right, supra note 123, at 632
(asserting that indigent's inability adequately to defend himself due to lack of expert assistance is
inconsistent with equality before the law); Note, supra note 24, at 1359 (advocating placement of
state and defendant on equal terms whenever state plans to use an expert).
136. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
137. See id.; see also State v. Poulsen, 45 Wash. App. 706, 726 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1986) (reversing
trial court's denial of psychiatric expert to indigent defendant in assault case, stating that the "un-
derlying purpose" of Ake is "promoting equal justice").
138. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text (discussing Moore).
139. 763 F.2d 975, 977 (8th Cir. 1985).
140. Id. at 976-77.
141. Id. at 977 (emphasis added). Other commentators have suggested similar standards. See
Note, Defendant's Due Process Right, supra note 135, at 334 (because insanity is a potentially dispos-
itive defense, "the requirement of a preliminary showing in Ake should be construed in a flexible
manner to recognize and reflect the public policy concern of a fair and accurate resolution of is-
sues"); Note, The Indigent's Right, supra note 123, at 644 ("The most reasonable formula is to
provide services ... at public expense to the extent that a refusal of funds in a particular case will
work undue hardship on the defendant"); Note, supra note 70, at 285 ("At the trial level, the defense
must make a reasonable demonstration of what is necessary and why" (citing Mason v. Arizona, 504
F.2d 1345, 1352 (9th Cir. 1974))); see also United States v. Bass, 477 F.2d 723, 725 (9th Cir. 1973)
(case under federal Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) which frames the issue in terms of
whether a reasonable attorney would engage such assistance for a client having the independent
financial means to pay for it).
142. See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text (discussing Moore).
143. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.
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Moore, which requires that the defendant prove the trial will be fundamentally
unfair, is not.
In contrast to the rigid requirements of Moore, construing Ake in terms of
reasonableness would give lower courts flexibility to respond to the facts. If a
resource basic to an adequate defense is at stake, 144 it makes sense to use a
standard that errs in favor of providing the assistance of an expert whenever
reasonably beneficial rather than a standard so difficult to meet that defendants
unable to conduct an adequate defense without assistance cannot obtain it. t4 5
Under the Vassar reasonableness standard, a lower court would view Ake
through a lens that allows defendants to receive help in cases in which sanity is a
reasonably significant factor, even if this would result in some defendants with
marginally justified sanity defenses receiving assistance. Because the trial court
would have the benefit of the expert's knowledge and insight, a greater number
of accurate determinations would result from a more expansive approach.' 46
The government's interest in accurate verdicts 47 and the grave consequences of
inaccurate determinations when human life and liberty are concerned justify the
extra cost. The reasonableness standard also would recognize that the motion
for expert assistance must be made before trial, during preliminary stages of
investigation and factual development.
B. Appointing a Defense Psychiatrist Chosen by Defendant
To accomplish the goals the Supreme Court set in Ake, lower courts should
appoint a defense psychiatrist, that is, a psychiatrist whose only role is to assist
the defense. While not constitutionally required, lower courts also should allow
the defendant some role in the choice of the psychiatrist. A defense psychiatrist
should not be the doctor who, for example, examined the defendant at the state
hospital at the court's request. Rather, the defense psychiatrist should be a phy-
sician from the private sector who would consult with and assist only the de-
fense. This independence from the state would enable the expert to fill all of the
roles discussed in Ake, and would also remove the potential for bias on the part
of psychiatrists employed by the government.148 If the defense psychiatrist ren-
dered an opinion unfavorable to the defendant, the defendant would have an
objective forecast of the likelihood of success of an insanity defense and could
more comfortably base decisions on such an opinion. The defense psychiatrist in
such a situation could still assist the defendant in the other roles described in
Ake. For the foregoing reasons, granting the defendant some degree of partici-
pation in the choice of the expert is the best way for the government to navigate
144. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
145. See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
146. See Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert, supra note 27, at 736 (allowing indi-
gent defendant to choose a psychiatrist gives defendant a "meaningful chance" to meet the state and
its.superior resources on true adversarial terms and more fully satisfies the "probable value" element
of the Mathews test).
147. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 79 ("The State's interest in prevailing at trial-unlike that of a private
litigant-is necessarily tempered by its interest in the fair and accurate adjudication of criminal
cases.").
148. See supra note 85.
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the shoals of ambiguity in Ake. 149
Giving the defendant a role in the choice of the expert could be accom-
plished by allowing the defendant to choose the psychiatrist outright,- by al-
lowing the. defendant to choose from a list maintained by the court, or by having
the court choose one name from a list submitted by the defendant. 150 These
alternatives have the advantage of giving the defendant his own: expert who can
serve the purposes outlined in Ake. Giving the defendant some role in the selec-
tion of the expert also would avoid the possibility of litigation over the effective-
ness of the assistance rendered by court-chosen experts.15 1 The costs would not
be significantly greater than the amount the state already bears, and it would
reduce the role played by wealth in the outcomes of criminal trials. 152
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ake decision promised to give indigent defendants access to a most
important tool to litigate an insanity defense-an expert psychiatric witness.
Lower courts often have interpreted Ake less than generously, unduly constrict-
ing the availability of the right. An interpretation of Ake that requires only that
the record reasonably support the significance of sanity at trial, rather than re-
quiring that the defendant demonstrate prejudice should the request for the ex-
pert be denied, will better serve the policy goals of Ake and afford some measure
of equal justice for the indigent defendant. Further, court appointment of a sin-
gle psychiatrist does not always fulfill the requirements the Supreme Court set
out in Ake. A defense psychiatrist whom the defendant helps choose will attain
the goals the Supreme Court articulated.
149. See Perlin, supra note 69, at 127; Note, The Right to a Partisan Psychiatric Expert, supra
note 27, at 729, 735-36 (since premise of the adversarial system is that partisan advocacy on both
sides will best assure that the guilty are punished and that the innocent go free, conflict should exist
between adversaries; without partisan expert, the defendant cannot meaningfully participate in ad-
versarial testing of the evidence); Note, The Indigent's Right, supra note 123, at 638-39; Note, De-
fendant's Due Process Right, supra note 135, at 336-37; see also Decker, supra note 28, at 579 (in
light of data that much scientific evidence is inaccurately derived, only by giving the defendant her
own expert will the defense have a reasonable chance of convincing the jury that "expert opinion-
making is often a rather subjective business").
150. See Note, supra note 24, at 1357 n.189.
151. See, e.g., Brown v. Dodd, 108 S. Ct. 33, 34-35 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari); Palmer v. State, 486 N.E.2d 477, 481-82 (Ind. 1985) (rejecting defendant's due process
claim based on the fact that court-appointed psychiatrist performed only a cursory examination and
failed to understand the state insanity defense statute).
152. The right to an independent psychiatrist may have sources other than the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court made clear in Oregon v. Haas,
420 U.S. 714 (1975), that the states remain free to hold their criminal justice machinery to higher
standards than the federal Constitution requires as a matter of their own law. Id. at 719. At least
one state constitution requires, as part of its guarantee of effective assistance of counsel, that counsel
have access to reasonable ancillary services such as experts. Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.
3d 307, 319-20, 682 P.2d 360, 366-67, 204 Cal. Rptr. 165, 171-72 (1984). Other states have extended
the protections afforded by their constitutions beyond what is required by the federal constitution as
well. See 1 J. CooK, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 1:8, at 21 n.16. Arguments by
analogy may be made from these cases in support of the right to an independent psychiatrist.
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